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Recent Cases
Covma Crs-Tmim PARTY BmcvLucs-BNmvcIRY's RIGHT AaisiNG
AT DEATH OF Paommsxa.-Appellant's aunt entered into a contract to
convey certain lands to another. The contract provided, inter alia, that
in the event the aunt should die before the entire purchase pnce was
paid, all subsequent payments would be made to the appellant. The
aunt died before the entire purchase pnce had been paid. The probate
court ordered the unpaid balance to be distributed to the residual
legatees. Appellant claimed the unpaid balance as a third party beneficiary under the contract. Held: Affirmed. Where a third person is to
receive any unpaid balance remaining on a contract at the death of the
promisee, there is no intent to create in the third person a present
interest that would constitute a valid gift inter vivos. The third party
is merely an incidental beneficiary and not entitled to the unpaid
balance. Coley v. English, 357 S.W.2d 529 (Ark. 1962).
The pnncipal case is disconcerting not because of any departure
by the court from the well established rules of third party beneficiary
law but because of apparent confusion by the court in the application
of these rules. The third party beneficiary doctrine is firmly established
in most junsdictions.1 Moreover, the courts exhibit a strong tendency
to follow the classification used in the Restatement of Contracts as to
those beneficianes who may sue on a contract.2
Under the Restatement classification, beneficianes who may sue on
a contract are divided into two classes-donee and creditor. A person
is a donee beneficiary
if it appears from the terms of the promise

in

view of the accom-

panying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining
the promise of all or part of the performance thereof is to make a gift
to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor
supposed or asserted to be due
to some performance neither due nor
from the promisee to the beneficiary.3

A person is a creditor beneficiary
if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of the promise in
view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the
promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the
112
Am. Jur. Contracts §277 (1938).
2
Restatement, Contracts 1183 (1932) classifies the beneficiaries. Sections
135-36 of the Restatement provide which beneficiaries may sue. See 2 Williston,
Contracts 823 n.3 (3rd ed. 1957) for cases following the Restatement classification.
8 Restatement, Contracts §133(1)a (1932).
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promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of the beneficiary against the
promisee which has been barred by the Statute of Limitations or by
a discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of the
Statute of Frauds.4

Beneficiaries who may not enforce a contract are termed incidental
beneficiaries by the Restatement. A person is an incidental beneficiary
if the facts stated in the above quoted sections do not exist.5
It is evident in the pnncipal case that the appellant was not a
creditor beneficiary. There was no evidence to indicate that the aunt
owed him any duty. However the facts strongly substantiate that the
appellant was a donee beneficiary under the contract. Under the Restatement category, he only had to show that the aunt intended to
make a gift or to confer a right. In the principal case the court seemed
bothered by the possibility that the promisor s duty to perform under
the contract might have ended before the appellant's right to receive
performance began. But this possibility should not be controlling
because if the aunt did not make a gift in the sense that it was a
transfer of an indefinite amount, the contract itself is strong evidence
of intent to confer a right to a sum of money at her death. Contingent
as it was, it was still a right.6
In attempting to recover as a protected beneficiary, the plaintiff
relied on a similar case 7 in which the only real distinction was that the
promisee owed the third person a duty. In distinguishing the cases the
court said that in the principal case the appellant was an incidental
beneficiary because the promisee owed him no duty.8 This reasoning is
a misapplication of third party beneficiary law since a person does not
have to be a creditor bencficiary to be protected. A donee beneficiary
is also protected. The result, then, is that the Arkansas court is
protecting creditor beneficiancs but not donee beneficiaries under these
circumstances. However the majority of the courts treat the creditor
and the donce beneficiary at least on equal terms.9 The Restatement
even favors the donee.10
Although it appears that the appellant was a donee beneficiary and
therefore entitled to recover, the court was further troubled by the
4Id. §133(1)b.
51 d. §133(1)c.
0 4 Corbin, Contracts 263 (1951). Cf. Colomal Discount Co. v. Avon Motors,
Inc., 137 Conn. 196, 75 A.2d 507 (1950), noted in 12 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 295 (1957).
7 Freer v. J. G. Putman Funeral Home, Inc., 195 Ark. 307, 111 S.W.2d 463
(1937).
8 Coley v. English, 357 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Ark. 1962).
9 2 Williston, Contracts §356 (3rd ed. 1957).
10nRestatement. Contracts §§135-36 (1932). The creditor-beneficiary s right

arises with the formation of the contract, hut, unlike the donee-heneficiary s right,
it is not immediately indefeasible. The creditor may lose his right unless he
changes his position in reliancc on the contract. Section 136(l1), comment a.
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fact that the beneficiary's right arose only at the death of the promisee.
However the strong majority rule is that a contract is not made testamentary by the fact that the donee beneficiary's right is postponed until
the death of the promisee." If it were otherwise, life insurance contracts in which the insurance is payable to one other than the estate of
the insured would be testamentary.' 2 Also, since the contract was in
full force during the promisee's lifetime, there is no reason to surround
it with the formalities which safeguard a will. 1'
The court thought the contract testamentary mainly, it seems,
",14
because the promisee "retained full control over the contract
It appears that the court in using this reasoning misunderstood the
problem. "Control," in this context, is a personal property term. 5 But
this is not a case of a personal property right, as such, but a contract
right. The third party beneficiary's right is a contract right whether he
be creditor or donee. The right in question in the principal case is
created by a contract between the promisor and the promisee, the
validity of which is determined by the law of contracts 16 and not by the
law of gifts of personal property Therefore, the court should have
upheld the appellant's right to recover as a donee beneficiary.
Charles Samuel Whitehead

CONTRACTS-AN INTERPRETATION OF TEE UNIFORMAv

COIMMZIERCIAL CODE

2-207(1) - Plaintiff, a manufacturer of cellophane bags,
ordered a drum of emulsion from defendant. In replying, defendant
mailed a standardized form of acknowledgment stating various terms
of sale which included a clause disclaiming any warranties whatsoever.
Plaintiff received the emulsion, but bags produced with it failed to
adhere. In an action for breach of warranty plaintiff contended
SECTION

" Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1942);
Robinson s Women s Apparel, Inc. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 67 F. Supp. 895
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Raney, 358 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d
624 (1944); In re Kosss Estate, 106 N.J. Eq. 323, 150 Atl. 360 (1930); Roberts
v. Ellis, 229 Ore. 609, 868 P.2d 342 (1962); Peoples Bank v. Baxter, 41 Tenn.
App. 710, 298 S.W.2d 732 (1956); But see McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 24
N.E.2d 102 (1939), criticized m 53 Harv.L. Rev. 1060 (1940) and 51 Yale L.J.
1 (1941).
2
Robinson s Women s Apparel, Inc. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., supra note
11.
i Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 358 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d 624 (1944).
14 Coley v. English, 357 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Ark. 1962).
15 See Brown, Personal Property §39 (1955). Control is an aspect of the

delivery requirement m the law of gifts of personal property. If after an alleged
delivery the donor still retains control over whatever is given, there is no gift
16 Roberts v. Ellis, 229 Ore. 609, 368 P.2d 342 (1962); see 4 Corbin, Contracts 71 (1951).

